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Negotiating Between Harris and Michael:
Who is Entitled to Undistributed Payments




Conversion from a Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 bankruptcy is one of the
most essential tools in a debtor's arsenal. However, over the past several
decades, courts have clashed when applying the Bankruptcy Code to cer-
tain situations arising from such a conversion. Although Congress ad-
dressed one such disagreement in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
another hotly debated issue remained over whether debtors or creditors
should receive undistributed funds held by Chapter 13 trustees upon con-
version to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The issue led to a circuit split in 2014
when the Fifth Circuit, in In re Harris, ruled in favor of creditors, which
contrasted with the Third Circuit's previous ruling in favor of debtors in
In re Michael.
This Comment argues that Congress never intended for either debt-
ors or creditors to have an absolute right to such undistributed funds up-
on conversion, which is supported through analyses of the Bankruptcy
Code, legislative history, and policy. Rather, Congress intended the par-
ties to negotiate for a term that would resolve the potential issue in their
Chapter 13 bankruptcy repayment plan. The Comment proposes that
Congress or the Supreme Court should clarify the matter by explicitly
requiring the parties to provide such a provision in the plan.
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 644
II. B ACKGROUN D ....................................................................................... 646
A. Conversion from a Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 Bankruptcy ............... 646
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, 2016.
644 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:2
1. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy ............................................................ 646
2. Chapter 7 Bankruptcy .............................................................. 649
3. C onversion .............................................................................. 649
B. Resolution of the Pre-1994 Circuit Split ...................................... 650
C . The Current Circuit Split .............................................................. 652
1. Overview of 1n re Michael ...................................................... 653
2. Overview of In re H arris ......................................................... 654
III. A N A LY SIS ............................................................................................. 654
A. Analysis of the Bankruptcy Code through In re Michael and In
re H arris ....................................................................................... 654
1. Text of the Bankruptcy Code .................................................. 655
2. Legislative H istory .................................................................. 659
3. P olicy ....................................................................................... 66 0
B. Congress's Intentional Failure to Resolve the Issue in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 .................................................. 662
C. Congress's Intent to have the Parties Resolve the Issue in the
P lan .............................................................................................. 66 3
1. Support from Bankruptcy Code ............................................... 664
2. Support from Legislative History ............................................. 664
3. Support from Policy ................................................................. 665
D. Congress or the Supreme Court should Explicitly Require the
Parties to Resolve the Issue in the Plan ........................................ 665
IV . C ON CLUSION ....................................................................................... 666
I. INTRODUCTION
A vital mechanism in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, which allows a
debtor to repay creditors without liquidating existing assets,' is the debt-
or's ability to convert to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy to discharge debt
through liquidation when that becomes the debtor's most prudent course
of action.2 However, this critical device has been undermined by uncer-
tainty over whether a debtor or creditors receive undistributed funds held
by a Chapter 13 trustee
3 after conversion to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
4
Disagreement over which party is entitled to such funds has tormented
1. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322*a)(1)(2012).
2. See Viegelahn v. Harris (In re Harris), 757 F.3d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 2014); Kath-
erine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEX.
L. REv. 103, 132 (2011) (noting the importance of conversions from Chapter 13 to Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcies because they often become the debtor's best option).
3. "[O]ne who, having legal title to property, holds it in trust for the benefit of an-
other and owes a fiduciary duty to that beneficiary." Trustee, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(9th ed. 2009).
4. See, e.g., In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 471; In re Michael, 699 F.3d 307, 307 (3d
Cir. 2012).
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lower courts for decades.' While Congress addressed a similar question
in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,6 the quandary over which party is
entitled to funds not yet distributed at the time of conversion remained.7
In 2014, the Fifth Circuit, in In re Harris ("Harris"),8 created a circuit
split over the matter when the court found for creditors and rejected the
Third Circuit's opinion, in In re Michael ("Michael"),9 in favor of debt-
ors.10
In this Comment's "background section," Part A will begin with a
brief explanation of Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcies, and the con-
version from the former to the latter." Part B will then discuss the prior
pre-1994 circuit split that arose over the conversion and describe Con-
gress's attempt to resolve the issue.12 Part C will explain the recent de-
velopments that led to the new circuit split between the Third Circuit in
Michael and the Fifth Circuit in Harris.'
3
In the "analysis section," Part A will examine the divergent opin-
ions of those circuit courts as well as lower courts, which will show that
the Bankruptcy Code ("Code"), legislative history, and policy are am-
biguous with regard to the issue.1 4 Part B will describe the vast number
of pre-1994 cases that dealt with this issue to show that Congress was
aware of this present matter in 1994 but deliberately chose to resolve on-
ly the issue surrounding the previous circuit split.'5 Part C will explain
that analyzing the Code and legislative history reveals that Congress in-
tended for the parties to negotiate for a term in the Chapter 13 bankrupt-
cy repayment plan ("plan") that would resolve the matter, and a policy
analysis will suggest that this is a prudent rule.16 Lastly, Part D will rec-
ommend that either Congress or the Supreme Court clarify the rule by
explicitly stating that the parties must negotiate for such a term in the
plan.
17
5. See, e.g., In re Peters, 44 B.R. 68, 73 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re
Rutenbeck, 78 B.R. 912, 913 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987).
6. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-94, 108 Stat. 4106
(1994); 11 U.S.C. § 348(f).
7. See In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 471; In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 307.
8. Viegelahn v. Harris (In re Harris), 757 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2014).
9. In re Michael, 699 F.3d 307 (3d Cir. 2012).
10. See In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 471; In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 307.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part I.B; 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (2012).
13. See infra Part IIC; In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 471; In re Michael, 699 F.3d at
307.
14. See infra Part IILA; In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 471; In re Michael, 699 F.3d at
307.
15. See infra Part I.B; 11 U.S.C. § 348(o.
16. See infra Part III.C.
17. See infra Part ILI.D.
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II. BACKGROUND
To better understand this Comment's topic, this section will focus
on three separate matters to provide the necessary context surrounding
the present circuit split's specific bankruptcy issue. First, the differences
between Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcies will be explained, fol-
lowed by an explanation of the process of converting the former to the
latter.8 Then, the pre-1994 circuit split that arose over an issue related to
such a conversion and the resolution of that split through the passage of
11 U.S.C. § 348(f)' 9 of the Bankruptcy Code will be discussed.20 Final-
ly, the issue leading to the current circuit split that went unaddressed by §
348(f) will be explained.21
A. Conversion from a Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
1. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy
A Chapter 13 bankruptcy allows an individual debtor to repay both
secured and unsecured claims22 without liquidating the debtor's existing
assets. 23 A debtor can commence a Chapter 13 bankruptcy by filing a
petition with a bankruptcy court. Filing the petition creates an estate
composed of all the debtor's property at the time of the filing, and any
property or income obtained after the filing "but before the case is
closed, dismissed or converted.' 25 The debtor ordinarily pays the credi-
tors back through future income pursuant to a plan.26
The debtor may either file the plan with the Chapter 13 petition, or
within 14 days thereafter.27 Failure to file the plan within the required
time is a ground for either dismissing the case or for converting the case
from a Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 bankruptcy.28 Under § 1322(a), the debt-
or must disclose several elements of the plan.29  For instance, §
18. See infra Part II.A*
19. 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(2012).
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See infra Part II.C.
22. An unsecured claim means that a creditor "does not have a lien or right of set-
off against the debtor's property," which is contrary to a secured claim when a creditor
does have such a lien or right. Claim, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1).
24, Id. § 301(a).
25, Id. § 1306(a)(2).
26. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1322.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2012) ("Chapter 13... plans [are] funded primarily from future income.").
27. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(3).
29. See id. § 1322(a).
[Vol. 120:2
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1322(a)(1) requires the debtor to submit that the future income necessary
to the plan's execution is under the trustee's control.30 Courts have in-
terpreted this provision in a manner that allows, in some instances, the
debtor to bypass the trustee in order to directly pay certain creditors out-
side the plan, such as mortgage companies.31 In another example,
§ 1322(a) also requires the debtor to state that certain claims will be paid
in full, unless the holder of such a claim agrees otherwise.32
In addition to the disclosures mandated by § 1322(a), § 1322(b) lists
provisions the plan "may" include.33 For example, the plan may modify
either unsecured or secured creditors' rights.34 The plan may also in-
clude a provision indicating whether the Chapter 13 estate vests35 in the
debtor or in another entity, and at what stage of the bankruptcy proceed-
ing that vesting occurs.36 Furthermore, "any other appropriate provision
not inconsistent' 37 with the Code may also be included in the plan.38
After all parties in interest are notified of the impending Chapter 13
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court will hold a confirmation hearing on the
proposed plan.39 Although the interested parties lack the authority to ac-
cept the proposed plan, the hearing is held to give them an opportunity to
object to the proposed plan.40 These objections often lead to negotiations
between the parties and modifications to the initial plan by the debtor.41
If the parties do not come to an agreement, the objecting party can then
attempt to meet the initial burden of production by producing evidence
that the plan does not meet the Code's requirements established in §
1325.42 If the burden of production is satisfied, the debtor then has a
30. Id. § 1322(a)(1).
31. See, e.g., In re Aberegg, 961 F.2d 1307, 1308 (7th Cir. 1992) ("We conclude
that Chapter 13 authorizes confirmation of plans including.., direct-payment provi-
sions.").
32. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (stating that, in the plan, the debtor "shall provide for
the fill payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to priority.. unless
the holder of a particular claim agrees to a different treatment of such claim").
33. Id. § 1322(b).
34. Id. § 1322(b)(2).
35. Vesting occurs when an entity is "confer[red] ownership (of property)." Vest,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
36. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(9).
37. Id. § 1322(b)(11).
38. Id.
39. See id. § 1324(a).
40. Id. ("The court shall hold a hearing on confirmation of the plan. A party in in-
terest may object to confirmation of the plan.").
41. See, e.g., Nielsen v. DLC Inv. (In re Nielsen), 211 B.R. 19, 20 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.
1997).
42. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325; Shortridge v. Ruskin (In re Shortridge), 65 F.3d 169, 170
(6th Cir. 1995); In re Mendenhall, 54 B.R. 44, 45-46 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1985).
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burden of proof to show the requirements of § 1325 are met in their
plan.43 Thus, after the confirmation hearing, the court will confirm the
plan if the debtor has met the conditions specified in § 1325.
44
The bankruptcy court's confirmation of a plan binds the debtor and
all creditors regardless of whether a creditor accepted or objected to the
plan.45 Additionally, unless the plan or order confirming the plan pro-
vides otherwise, the property of the estate is vested in the debtor46 "free
and clear" of any creditor's claim provided for in the plan.47
After confirmation, the trustee is required to distribute payments to
the creditors pursuant to the plan,48 absent court approval directing oth-
erwise.49 Once the debtor has made all payments required by the plan,
the court must grant the debtor discharge.o The act of discharge releases
the debtor from all debt obligations provided for in the plan, subject to
exceptions specified in § 1328.51 Thus, Chapter 13 bankruptcies are of-
ten appealing because of the opportunity they provide debtors to dis-
43. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325; In re Lofty, 437B.R. 578,584(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010).
44. The relevant provisions in § 1325 include:
(a)(1) the plan complies with the provisions of [the Code];
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that-
(II) if the case.., is dismissed or converted without completion of
the plan, such lien shall [] be retained by such holder...;
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distrib-
uted under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed
amount of such claim; and
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder;
(6) the debtor will be able to ... comply with the plan;
(b)(1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the
confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of
the effective date of the plan-
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account of
such claim is not less than the amount of such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income
to be received... under the plan will be applied to make payments to un-
secured creditors under the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1325.
45. Id. § 1327(a).
46. Id. § 1327(b).
47. Id. § 1327(c).
48. Id. § 1326(c).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(c); see Mendoza v. Temple-Inland Mortg. Corp. (In re Men-
doza), 111 F.3d 1264, 1265 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that the court can order the debtor to
make post-petition mortgage payments directly to the creditor); In re Aberegg, 961 F.2d
1307, 1310 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that the court can approve plans under which the
debtor distributes certain payments directly to creditors).
50. Id. § 1328(a).
51. Seeid. § 1328.
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charge debt without liquidating their estate, which is not an opportunity
provided by Chapter 7 bankruptcies.
2. Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
In contrast to Chapter 13 bankruptcies, Chapter 7 bankruptcies are
funded through liquidating the debtor's estate.52 Thus, the proceeds from
the sale of the debtor's assets are put toward the Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
53
The debtor's estate is comprised of all the debtor's property at the time
of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing. 54 Subject to exceptions, the liquidat-
ed estate is used to pay creditors, and any remaining debt is discharged.55
Debtors often turn to Chapter 7 bankruptcies to discharge their debt after
the debtors realize that adherence to their Chapter 13 plans is no longer
monetarily feasible.56 Debtors are able to fall back on Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcies through a process known as conversion.57
3. Conversion
A debtor who enters into a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, but is not able to
comply with the confirmed plan, is permitted to convert his case to a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy at any time.58 This is often a crucial tool for a
debtor, evidenced by the fact that Chapter 13 bankruptcies are completed
59in only approximately one-third of all cases. While the Chapter 13
trustee's services are terminated upon conversion, 60 the trustee must ac-
count for any funds that came into the trustee's possession in a final re-
port.61 Despite the frequency and importance of conversions, certain de-
tails of the process have been murky for decades because of
disagreements among courts.62 In addition to the present circuit split,
52. See Viegelahn v. Harris (In re Harris), 757 F.3d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 2014).
53. See HON. W. HOMER DRAKE, JR. & KAREN D. VISSER, BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE
FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER § 11: 1 (2014).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 541.
55. See In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 471.
56. See Porter, supra note 2, at 132.
57. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a).
58. Id.
59. See Porter, supra note 2, at 107-11 (using studies to support position that only
1/3 of Chapter 13 bankruptcies are successfully completed, and noting that this trend has
existed for "more than thirty years").
60. 11 U.S.C. § 348(e).
61. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1019(5)(B)(ii).
62. See infra Part II.B.
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these judicial divergences arising from conversions led to a circuit split
in 1991.63
B. Resolution of the Pre-1994 Circuit Split
Given the dynamics of a Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 bankruptcy con-
version, an inevitable question arose over whether the converted estate
included the property acquired during the Chapter 13 proceeding but be-
fore the conversion, or instead was limited to the debtor's property held
at the time the Chapter 13 petition was filed.64 In fact, before the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1994, there was a circuit split on this issue.65
In 1985, in In re Bobroff,6 6 the Third Circuit held that the debtor's
tort claims brought after the Chapter 13 petition would not be included in
the Chapter 7 bankruptcy.67 The Bobroff court found that Congress in-
tended the Code to be interpreted in a way that Chapter 13 repayment
plans were encouraged over Chapter 7 liquidations and that ruling in fa-
vor of the debtor would further that purpose.68 The court reasoned that
debtors would be disincentivized to enter into Chapter 13 bankruptcies if
property acquired after the beginning of the proceeding was at risk of be-
ing liquidated.69
Six years after the Bobroff decision, the Seventh Circuit created the
circuit split in In re Lybrook.70 The Lybrook court held that farmland in-
herited by the debtor during the Chapter 13 proceeding became part of
the Chapter 7 estate upon conversion.7' Writing for the majority, Judge
Posner reasoned that holding otherwise would not promote any legiti-
mate interests of the debtor and would, instead, encourage opportunistic
behavior that would ultimately hurt creditors.72
In addition to Bobroff and Lybrook, other circuit court decisions
contributed to the split, all of which favored an interpretation similar to
the Third Circuit's in Lybrook. A year before Bobroff, the Eighth Circuit
found that, upon conversion, the debtor's estate was determined by the
63. See In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 136 (7th Cir. 1991); In re Bobroff, 766 F.2d
797, 797 (3d Cir. 1985).
64. See, e.g., In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d at 136; In re Bobroff, 766 F.2d at 797.
65. See, e.g., In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d at 136; In re Bobroff, 766 F.2d at 797.
66. In re Bobroff, 766 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1985).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 803.
69. Id.
70. In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 138.
72. Id. ("[A] rule of once in, always in is necessary to discourage strategic, oppor-
tunistic behavior that hurts creditors without advancing any legitimate interest of debt-
ors.").
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date of conversion rather than the date the debtor initially filed for the
Chapter 13 bankruptcy.73 Similarly, in 1992, the Tenth Circuit held that
a debtor's funds acquired after the Chapter 13 petition became part of the
Chapter 7 estate upon conversion.74 The court explicitly stated that it
agreed with Judge Posner's statutory interpretation and policy analysis in
Lybrook.75
Resolution of the circuit split ultimately came when Congress
passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, which included § 348(f).76
This provision provides that:
when a case under chapter 13 of this title is converted . property of
the estate in the converted case shall consist of property of the estate,
as of the date of filing of the petition, that remains in the possession
of or is under the control of the debtor on the date of conversion. 77
The accompanying House Report noted that the provision was in-
cluded to resolve the circuit split over "what property is in the bankrupt-
cy estate when a debtor converts from chapter 13 to chapter 7.,78 The
Report further states that the amendment "overrules the holding in cases
such as... Lybrook.. . and adopts the reasoning of Bobroff.... , The
Report also notes the discretion given to courts in the case of a bad faith
conversion.80 This exception states that if the conversion is executed in
bad faith, "the property of the estate in the converted case shall consist of
the property of the estate as of the date of conversion.' '81 Although Con-
gress met this circuit split issue head on in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, there was another key disagreement over the details of conversions
that was left unresolved.2
73. In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087, 1088-99 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that, at the
time of conversion, a debtor could claim a different homestead exemption than the one
chosen at the beginning of the Chapter 13 proceeding).
74. In re Calder, 973 F.2d 862, 865-66 (10th Cir. 1992).
75. See id. at 866.
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 348(0(2012); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-94, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994); Viegelahn v. Harris (In re Harris), 757 F.3d 468, 473 (5th
Cir. 2014) ("In 1994, Congress resolved the circuit split by enacting 11 U.S.C.
§ 348(0 ...")-
77. Id. § 348(f)(1)(A).
78. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 57 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340,
3366 (citations omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id. ("[Section 348(0] also gives the court discretion, in a case in which the
debtor has abused the right to convert and converted in bad faith, to order that all proper-
ty held at the time of conversion shall constitute property of the estate in the converted
case.").
81. 11. U.S.C. § 348(0(2).
82. See infra Part II.C.
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C. The Current Circuit Split
Congress's success in resolving the pre-1994 circuit split is unques-
tioned, as it is now well-established that any property acquired during the
Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding does not become part of the Chapter 7
estate.83 Section 348 failed, however, to address another important ques-
tion: who receives undistributed payments, made pursuant to the plan,
upon conversion?84 Courts have since reached opposite answers to the
question, including the Third and Fifth Circuits.85
Although the circuit split arose only recently, lower courts have
been grappling over this issue for decades.86 During that time, courts
have answered the question in three different ways.87 First, some courts
have held that the undistributed payments held by the Chapter 13 trustee
should be handed over to the Chapter 7 trustee.88 However, as noted
above, § 348(f) abrogated this option by explicitly stating that Chapter 13
property cannot become part of the Chapter 7 estate.89 A second option,
adopted by some lower courts, requires the undistributed payments be
returned to the debtor upon conversion.9" Lastly, other courts determined
that the Chapter 13 trustee should distribute the funds to creditors, pursu-
ant to the Chapter 13 plan.91 These last two contrasting solutions were
the answers provided by the Third Circuit in Michael and the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Harris, causing the current circuit split.92 The facts of these two
83. Viegelahn v. Harris (In re Harris), 757 F.3d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 2014) ("After
the passage of § 348(f), it is clear that property acquired after the filing of a Chapter 13
petition, including wages, does not become part of the Chapter 7 estate upon conversion
(absent bad faith).").
84. See, e.g., In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 471; In re Michael, 699 F.3d 307, 307 (3d
Cir. 2012).
85. Compare In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 471, with In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 307.
86. See, e.g., In re Peters, 44 B.R. 68, 73 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re
Rutenbeck, 78 B.R. 912, 913 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987).
87. In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 308 (noting that "courts considering the disposition
of funds held by a Chapter 13 trustee at the time of conversion reached three different
results").
88. See, e.g., In re Tracy, 28 B.R. 189, 190 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983) (holding that the
undistributed payments became part of the Chapter 7 estate).
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(2012).
90. See, e.g., In re Boggs, 137 B.R. 408, 411 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1992) (finding
that the undistributed funds held by the Chapter 13 trustee should be returned to the debt-
or upon conversion to a Chapter 7).
91. See, e.g., In re Waugh, 82 B.R. 394, 400 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that
undistributed payments should be distributed to the creditors as provided by the Chapter
13 plan).
92. See, e.g., Viegelahn v. Harris (In re Harris), 757 F.3d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 2014);
In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 307.
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cases are essential to understand the current problem and the importance
of resolving it.
1. Overview of In re Michael
In 2012, the Third Circuit, in Michael, became the first circuit to
address which party is entitled to undistributed payments when a Chapter
13 bankruptcy is converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.93 In Michael, the
debtor's Chapter 13 plan required him to pay $277 per month to the trus-
tee for 53 months.94 Pursuant to the plan, the trustee then distributed
those funds to secured creditors and, if any funds remained, to unsecured
creditors.95 Additionally, outside of the plan, the debtor agreed to make
his regular mortgage payments to his mortgage company, which was also
a secured creditor under the plan.96 The debtor's wages were attached to
fund the plan, and were sent directly to the trustee.97 The debtor, howev-
er, defaulted on his regular mortgage payments, causing the court to
grant the mortgage company permission to lift the automatic stay to fore-
close upon the debtor's residence.98
After foreclosure, the debtor did not modify his plan and continued
to make payments pursuant to the original plan.99 However, to avoid
creating possible defenses to its mortgage foreclosure, such as estoppel,
the mortgage company refused to accept any further payments that the
company was entitled to under that plan.100 The trustee then accumulated
those funds, which totaled $9,181.62, until the debtor converted his case
to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.10' Ultimately, the Third Circuit found that the
undistributed funds should be returned to the debtor.102 In the following
section, an analysis of the court's decision will be provided and com-
pared to that of the court in Harris to shed light on the Code's ambiguity
in regard to the current circuit split issue.
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2. Overview of In re Harris
Two years after Michael, the Fifth Circuit created the existing cir-
cuit split with Harris.°3 In that case, the debtor's Chapter 13 plan re-
quired him to make monthly payments of $530 to the trustee for 60
months.10 4 These payments were then to be distributed by the trustee to
the secured creditors, then to the debtor's attorneys, and lastly to the un-
secured creditors.10 5 The plan also required the debtor to make payments
directly to his mortgage company, which was also a secured creditor.
0 6
The debtor, however, failed to make the direct payments to the mortgage
company, and therefore the automatic stay was lifted on the debtor's
home so that the mortgage company could proceed with foreclosure.10 7
After foreclosure, the trustee placed a hold on the funds that were
supposed to go to the mortgage company.0 8 Those funds began to ac-
cumulate with the trustee, amounting to $4,319.22, because the debtor
continued to make his monthly payments according to the plan.'09 In the
end, the Fifth Circuit held that those funds should be distributed to the
creditors pursuant to the plan.110 The Fifth Circuit's rationale will be an-
alyzed and compared to the Third Circuit's rationale in the next section
to demonstrate that the Code does not resolve the question posed by the
present circuit split.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Analysis of the Bankruptcy Code through In re Michael and In re
Harris
Determining whether debtors or creditors have an absolute right to
the undistributed funds through analyses of the Code's text, relevant leg-
islative history and policy leads to the conclusion that the Code provides
no certain answer."1 Nowhere is this more apparent than through a
comparison of the Third Circuit's interpretation in Michael and the Fifth
Circuit's interpretation in Harris."2 The ultimate stalemate on each ar-





108. In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 471.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See infra Part III.A.
112. See In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 478; In re Michael, 699 F.3d 307, 313-14 (3d Cir.
2012).
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gument between those circuit courts shows that there is no clear answer
to whether debtors or creditors have an absolute right to undistributed
funds upon conversion."3  In fact, Congress deliberately chose not to
give either party an absolute right to the undistributed funds." 4 Congress
made that decision in order to give the parties the discretion to provide a
resolution in the plan."5 However, Congress or the Supreme Court must
resolve the issue once and for all by explicitly requiring the parties to ne-
gotiate for such a term in the plan."
16
1. Text of the Bankruptcy Code
Analyzing the Third and Fifth Circuit's respective statutory inter-
pretations in Michael and Harris highlights the Code's failure to address
the present issue. To begin this analysis, § 348(f)(2) must be examined,
which is a provision both circuit courts combed for an indication that
Congress intended to address this issue while resolving the pre-1994 cir-
cuit split. 17 Section 348(f)(2) stands for the proposition that if a debtor
converts a Chapter 13 case in bad faith then he or she is not entitled to
property acquired post-petition, such as wages.1' 8 Following that logic,
the Third Circuit majority in Michael found that it is therefore implied
that the debtor should receive the post-petition property if he or she acts
in good faith."9 The Michael opinion further noted that the penalty for
converting in bad faith would be "diminished significantly" if the post-
petition property were to go to creditors in good faith conversions as
well.
120
However, the Fifth Circuit took a contrary position in Harris. The
Harris court noted that undistributed post-petition funds make up only a
portion of a debtor's post-petition property and, upon a bad faith conver-
sion, a debtor would have to give up all post-petition property.12' Thus,
distributing the funds held by the trustee to the creditors upon conversion
"neither renders [§] 348(f)(2) superfluous nor removes the disincentive
for bad faith ....
113. See infra Part III.A.
114. See infra Part III.B.
115. See infra Part III.C.
116. See infra Part III.D.
117. See In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 478; In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 313-14.
118. 11 U.S.C. § 348()(2)(2012) ("If the debtor converts a case under chapter 13 ...
in bad faith, the property of the estate in the converted case shall consist of the property
of the estate as of the date of conversion.").
119. In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 313-14.
120. Id. at 315.
121. In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 478.
122. Id.
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A provision of the Code that superficially appears to explicitly ad-
dress the present issue, § 1327(b), also ultimately ends up being a bridge
to a murky answer. Section 1327(b) states, "[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
vided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a
plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor."12 3 The Third
Circuit majority in Michael relied heavily on this provision in its opinion,
finding it to mean that the debtor has a vested right in the property of the
Chapter 13 estate until the funds are actually transferred by the trustee to
the creditors. 124
In response, the Fifth Circuit in Harris noted that such a finding ig-
nores the exception segment of the provision that states, "except as oth-
erwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan."1 25 With
that exception in mind, the Harris court noted that a debtor clearly does
not retain possession of payments that are provided in the plan and made
to the trustee.26  Furthermore, the court found that the statute, as a
whole, actually seems to "divest[] the debtor of any interest he may have
in the payments made to the trustee," in such a situation.
127
In fact, some courts and individuals, including the trustee in Harris,
have found that, under § 1326(a)(2), creditors actually have a vested
right to the funds pursuant to the plan once the trustee receives the funds
from the debtor.128 That provision reads, "[i]f a [Chapter 13] plan is con-
firmed, the trustee shall distribute any such payment in accordance with
the plan as soon as is practicable."' 129  As can be observed in Harris,
some courts have found that the word "shall" in that provision creates a
trust fund for the creditors.130  To further support that position, those
courts and others13' quote another portion of § 1326(a)(2) that provides,
"[i]f a plan is not confirmed, the trustee shall return [all] payments ...
123. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b).
124. See In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 313; see also Resendez v. Lindquist, 691 F.2d
397, 399-400 (8th Cir. 1982) (Bright, J., dissenting).
125. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b).
126. In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 477.
127. Id. at 478; see also In re Lennon, 65 B.R. 130, 136 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986).
128. See In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 475; In re Galloway, 134 B.R. 602, 603 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1991) (holding that after a debtor delivers the funds to the trustee in accord
with the Chapter 13 plan, "the creditors have a vested right to receive those payments
pursuant to the plan").
129. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2).
130. See In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 475-76 (quoting In re Waugh, 82 B.R. 394, 400
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988)) ("The word 'shall' in § 1326(a)(2) creates the condition of a
trust. [Thus.] [c]reditors have the right to the funds in an active confirmed chapter 13 plan
upon payment by the debtor.").
131. See, e.g., In re Galloway, 134 B.R. at 603; In re Bums, 90 B.R. 301, 304
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
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,,132 These courts have found that the lack of a similar provision regard-
ing undistributed post-confirmation funds shows that the debtor is not en-
titled to have such funds returned.
133
However, other courts, including the Third Circuit, have rejected
those arguments.34 These courts emphasized that § 1326(a)(2) does not
cover funds received by a trustee post-confirmation of a Chapter 13
plan.35 Moreover, they have noted that courts that have found that credi-
tors have a vested right impliedly through § 1326(a)(2) have never cited
any legislative history to support that position.13 6 In plain terms, these
courts found that "[§] 1326(a)(2) only address[es] the obligation of the
trustee to distribute payments in accordance with a confirmed plan; [it]
do[es] not vest creditors with any property rights.' 3 7
Another key provision that the Third and Fifth Circuits disagree
over is § 348(e), which states that "[c]onversion of a case ... terminates
the service of any trustee or examiner that is serving in the case before
such conversion.'' 138  The Third Circuit's majority opinion in Michael
found this provision suggests that the trustee has no authority to pay the
undistributed funds to creditors post-conversion. 139 While the majority in
Michael did acknowledge that the trustee has some "limited duties post-
conversion,"140 such as filing a final report that accounts for all of the
funds that came into his or her possession,141 the court found it illogical
to include the duty of distributing "funds under a plan that is no longer
operative.' 42 However, in rebutting that argument, the Fifth Circuit in
Harris noted that if the trustee lacks the power to distribute funds post-
conversion, then the debtor will not be able to receive the funds from the
trustee either because such an act would require the trustee to have that
same power.143 The dissent in Michael supported that position, finding
that there is no reason to conclude that Congress did not intend to include
132. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2).
133. See, e.g., In re Galloway, 134 B.R. at 603; In re Burns, 90 B.R. at 304.
134. See, e.g., In re Michael, 699 F.3d 307, 313 (3d Cir. 2012).
135. See In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 475 (citing In re Boggs, 137 B.R. 408, 410
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1992)).
136. Id. (citing In re Boggs, 137 B.R. at 410).
137. In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 313.
138. 11 U.S.C. § 348(e)(2012).
139. See In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 314.
140. Id.
141. Id. (speaking of a duty established by FED. R. BANKR. P. 1019(5)(b)(ii)).
142. Id.
143. Viegelahn v. Harris (In re Harris), 757 F.3d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 2014).
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the distribution of funds under the plan as another one of the trustee's du-
ties he or she must perform in finalizing the estate.144
The two circuits also disagree over whether conversion vacates the
Chapter 13 plan and, subsequently, the trustee's authority to pay credi-
tors pursuant to the plan. While the majority in Michael found that con-
version entirely vacates the plan because "Chapter 13 plan[s] ha[ve] no
relevance in a [Chapter 7] case,"'145 the Harris court noted that there is no
"statutory argument to support such an interpretation."'' 46 Again, the
Harris court suggested that the duties of the trustee to finalize the Chap-
ter 13 estate show that Congress intended the trustee to have the power to
distribute funds, especially because the payments were made while the
plan was still in effect.147 Moreover, as the majority in Michael conced-
ed, courts noted that, under § 1327(a),148 a confirmed plan creates a new
relationship between the debtor and the creditors that requires creditors
to forego certain rights in exchange for the debtor's promise to make
payments under the plan. 49 These courts have found that this bargained-
for agreement, confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court, "should not be made
a nullity by a later failure of the debtor to observe a confirmed plan."'
150
These diverging opinions about the Code's application to the ques-
tion of which party should receive the undistributed funds upon conver-
sion further suggests that Congress did not intend to provide a definite
answer. The lack of clarity provided by the Code's text demonstrates
that Congress intended the parties to provide a term in the plan that
would resolve such a situation, and Congress or the Supreme Court must
make that clear. The next logical source to analyze for guidance, the
Code's legislative history, further supports those conclusions.
144. In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 320 n.8 (Roth, J., dissenting) ("Since Congress in-
tended for the trustee to perform several ancillary duties to clean-up and finalize the ad-
ministration of the estate, ... there is no logical reason why distribution of funds pursuant
to the previously confirmed reorganization plan cannot be included as one of those ad-
ministrative duties.").
145. Id. at 312.
146. In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 475.
147. Id.
148. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a)(2012) ("The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debt-
or and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan,
and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.").
149. In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 311 (citing In re Bums, 90 B.R. 301, 304 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1988)); see id. at 320 (Roth, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 311 (quoting Spero v. Porreco (In re Porreco), 426 B.R. 529, 537 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 2010)).
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2. Legislative History
As demonstrated through the above analysis, the Code's plain text is
unclear in regard to resolving this issue. Similarly, the relevant legisla-
tive history does not provide the guidance needed to reach a more defi-
nite interpretation. Because of the relevance to the present issue, the leg-
islative history surrounding § 348(f)'s enactment of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994 will be the primary focus in this section.
Again, § 348(f) was passed to resolve the pre-1994 circuit split and
to make clear that post-petition property in a Chapter 13 case would not
become part of the Chapter 7 estate upon conversion, absent bad faith.'5'
A House Report noted that reaching a different conclusion "would create
a serious disincentive to chapter 13 filings."' 52 Courts have implied from
the legislative history that Congress's intent is to provide incentives for
filing Chapter 13 bankruptcies.153 Applying that philosophy to the cur-
rent issues, the Third Circuit in Michael and other lower courts have
found that distributing funds to creditors upon conversion runs counter to
that congressional intent because doing so establishes a disincentive for
Chapter 13 filings.
154
Contrary to that reasoning, the Fifth Circuit in Harris and other
lower courts have found that a debtor will not be "meaningfully de-
terred"'155 by knowing that their payments will not be returned if the
debtor decides to convert to Chapter 7.156 These courts reasoned that
"such a rule.., simply requires them to fully honor their obligation un-
der a confirmed plan up to the point when they voluntarily wish to termi-
nate the provisions of the plan and have their case dismissed or converted
to a Chapter 7 case."'157 After all, the courts reasoned, the debtor propos-
es the plan with full knowledge that the payments made to the Chapter
13 trustee will be distributed to the creditors.1 58 Whether those complet-
ed payments are still in the hands of the trustee at the time of the conver-
151. See In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 478-79.
152. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 57 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340,
3366.
153. In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 479 (referring to the lower court's opinion and the ma-
jority's opinion in In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 314-16).
154. Id. at 479 (referring to the lower court's opinion and the majority's opinion in
In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 314-16).
155. Id.
156. Id.; see also In re Bell, 248 B.R. 236, 240 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2000).
157. In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 479 (quoting In re Bell, 248 B.R. at 240).
158. Id.
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sion is "essentially fortuitous,"'59 depending solely upon the trustee's
speed in distributing those funds. 1
60
Moreover, these opinions also reasoned that the attached wages
used to make these payments are part of the "quid pro quo" that allows
the debtor "to stave off foreclosure and cure the mortgage default, retain
the use of his automobile, and enjoy the automatic stay."'161 Additionally,
at any time, the debtor can avoid further wages from being allocated to
the creditors, in accordance with the plan, by converting to a Chapter
7.162 Thus, based on the extensiveness of the debtor's rights, these opin-
ions reasoned that taking away the additional right to undistributed funds
would have little effect on the willingness of the debtor to file for Chap-
ter 13.163 Furthermore, these opinions found that if the debtor had the
additional right to undistributed funds, then the debtor would be in a bet-
ter position than if he had just filed for a Chapter 7 and would receive a
"windfall. ,, 64
The difference in opinions about § 348's legislative history rein-
forces the belief that Congress intended to leave it up to the parties to de-
termine which party would receive the undistributed funds upon conver-
sion. Either Congress or the Supreme Court could have clarified if this
was not Congress's original intention, but neither have done so yet. Ad-
ditionally, an analysis of the relevant policy bolsters the view that Con-
gress intended to allow the parties to determine who would receive the
undistributed funds upon conversion because there is no equitable reason
to give either party an absolute right to such funds.
3. Policy
Just as analyzing the Code's plain text and legislative history fails to
result in a clear indication of how Congress intended to resolve the mat-
ter, a policy analysis similarly shows there is no logical reason to favor
debtors over creditors in this situation, or vice versa. Some courts, such
as the Third Circuit in Michael, found that policy considerations support
creating a rule favoring debtors.1 65 These courts reasoned that even if the
funds are returned to the debtor, the creditors are still in a better position
159. Id.
160. Id. at 479; see In re Waugh, 82 B.R. 394, 400 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988).
161. In re Michael, 699 F.3d 307, 319 (3d Cir. 2012) (Roth, J., dissenting).
162. In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 480.
163. See In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 479; In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 320 (Roth, J., dis-
senting).
164. See In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 479; In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 320 (Roth, J., dis-
senting).
165. See In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 314-17.
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than would otherwise be the case if a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition was
initially filed. After all, the creditors will receive wage contributions that
they would not have received.166 Therefore, these courts found that there
is "no inherent inequity in refunding undisbursed wage contributions to
debtors on conversion."'
167
Conversely, other courts, such as the Fifth Circuit in Harris, have
found that equity weighs heavily in favor of distributing the funds to
creditors.168 These arguments are the same as those put forth with re-
gards to the legislative history to counter the position that distributing the
funds to creditors would serve as a disincentive to debtors contemplating
filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. These courts found that the debtor's at-
tached wages are the "quid pro quo" exchanged for the benefits of the
Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the debtor has voluntarily proposed these pay-
ments, and the debtor is free to end these payments at any time through
conversion.169 Moreover, these courts also noted that returning the funds
to the debtor is inequitable to the creditors because the depreciation of
the secured property used by the debtor injures creditors, and those credi-
tors are not reimbursed for the losses due to depreciation, upon conver-
sion. 170
Thus, similar to the textual and legislative history analyses, a policy
analysis suggests there is no clear answer to which party should receive
the undistributed funds upon conversion. The three analyses all support
the position that Congress wanted the parties to resolve the issue on a
case-by-case basis n the plan. Additionally, the high number of pre-
1994 cases that dealt with the present circuit split's exact issue strength-
en that conclusion because the cases demonstrate that Congress was
aware of the issue in 1994 and intentionally chose not to enact a statute
that would give one party an absolute right to the funds.
166. Id. at 312 (citing In re Boggs, 137 B.R. 408,410 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1992)).
167. Id. (quoting In re Boggs, 137 B.R. at 410).
168. In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 480 ("[D]istribution of the funds to creditors is sup-
ported by strong considerations of fairness.").
169. See id.; In re Michael, 699 F.3d at 320 (Roth, J., dissenting); In re Bell, 248
B.R. 236,239 n.3 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2000).
170. See In re Harris, 757 F.3d at 480 ("[C]onversion does not undo the disad-
vantages that creditors may have suffered as a result of the plan, such as depreciation of
secured property."); O'Quinn v. Brewer (In re O'Quinn), 143 B.R. 408, 413 (Bankr. S.D.
Miss. 1992) ("[It's] unfair to allow a debtor to drive and depreciate an automobile, occu-
py a home or use household goods ... [and] then snatch away the monies which the trus-
tee is holding to make the payments, but has not yet disbursed.").
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B. Congress's Intentional Failure to Resolve the Issue in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994
As the above sections demonstrate, examining the relevant Code
provisions, legislative history of § 348(f), and policy establishes that no
logical conclusion can be reached with regard to which party should have
the absolute right to receive the undistributed funds. However, this sec-
tion will outline the large number of pre-1994 cases that are analogous to
Michael and Harris to demonstrate that Congress was well aware of the
present matter in 1994 when they chose only to resolve the previous cir-
cuit split with the enactment of § 348(f). Thus, in combination with the
sections above, this section will demonstrate that Congress purposely
failed to address the issue to allow the parties to resolve the matter in the
plan.
Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, there were numerous
analogous cases to Michael and Harris, but there was no consensus
among courts regarding whether the debtor or creditors should receive
the undistributed funds. A chronological list of pre-1994 analogous cas-
es in favor of the debtor will first be provided, followed by a list of those
cases finding for creditors. To start, in 1984, in In re Peters,171 the bank-
ruptcy court found that the undistributed funds held by the Chapter 13
trustee should be returned to the debtor upon a conversion to a Chapter
7.172 Two years later, the bankruptcy court in In re Shattuck173 found that
the funds collected by the Chapter 13 trustee pursuant to the plan must be
returned to the debtor at the time of conversion.74 In 1987, the federal
district courts in both In re Luna i7 5 and In re de Vos176 ordered the Chap-
ter 13 trustee to repay the debtor the funds held by the trustee that were
undistributed at the time of conversion. 177 Furthermore, in 1992, another
bankruptcy court, in In re Boggs,178 found that the Chapter 13 trustee
must return the payments made by the debtor that were not yet distribut-
ed.
179
Conversely, there are even more cases finding that the undistributed
payments belonged to the creditors pursuant o the plan. In 1987, the
171. In re Peters, 44 B.R. 68 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).
172. See id. at 73.
173. In re Shattuck, 62 B.R. 14 (Bankr. D.N.H 1986).
174. See id. at 16.
175. In re Luna, 73 B.R. 999 (N.D. I11. 1987).
176. In re de Vos, 76 B.R. 157 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
177. See In reLuna, 73 B.R. at 1000;Inrede Vos, 76 B.R. at 160.
178. In re Boggs, 137 B.R. 408 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1992).
179. Seeid. at 411.
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bankruptcy court in In re Rutenbeck1 80 noted that when a debtor makes
payments pursuant to a confirmed plan and some of those funds are un-
distributed at the time of conversion, the Chapter 13 trustee should dis-
tribute those funds to the creditors.81 In that same year, another bank-
ruptcy court, in In re Redick,'82 ruled that the undistributed funds held by
a Chapter 13 trustee belonged to the creditors in accordance with the
plan.183 In 1988, three more bankruptcy courts, in In re Waugh,84 In re
Burns,'85 and In re Milledge186 held that the payments in the trustee's
possession were to be given to the creditors at the time of conversion. 187
In 1991, both bankruptcy courts in In re Halpenny188 and In re Gallo-
way'89 respectively held that the funds belonged to the creditors because
they had a vested right to the funds once the debtor paid the trustee in ac-
cordance with the confirmed plan.190 Lastly, one year later, in In re
O'Quinn,191 the bankruptcy court also held that the trustee must allocate
all undistributed funds to the creditors at the time of the conversion.
1 92
Listing these cases emphasizes the large number of pre-1994 cases
dealing with the exact issue that is now the cause of the present circuit
split. These cases demonstrate that there was an obvious disagreement
between the lower courts that Congress had to be aware of pre-1994, and
which should have foreshadowed the current dispute at the circuit level.
Thus, this plethora of cases further bolsters the idea that Congress chose
not to resolve the matter in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 so that
the parties could negotiate for a resolution on their own terms in the plan.
C. Congress's Intent to have the Parties Resolve the Issue in the Plan
As can be seen through the previous sections, Congress deliberately
chose not to establish a rule that would require the undistributed funds to
go to either the debtor or creditors. Instead, Congress decided to give
180. In re Rutenbeck, 78 B.R. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987).
181. See id. at 913 ("[T]he undistributed funds ought to be treated as trust funds for
the benefit of the creditors under the confirmed plan and distributed to those creditors in
accordance with the terms of the plan.").
182. In re Redick, 81 B.R. 881 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
183. See id. at 887.
184. In re Waugh, 82 B.R. 394 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988).
185. In re Bums, 90 B.R. 301 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
186. In re Milledge, 94 B.R. 218 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1988).
187. See In re Waugh, 82 B.R. at 400; In re Burns, 90 BR. at 305; In re Milledge,
94 B.R. at 220.
188. In re Halpenny, 125 B.R. 814 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1991).
189. In re Galloway, 134 B.R. 602 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1991).
190. See In re Halpenny, 125 B.R. at 816; In re Galloway, 134 B.R. at 604.
191. In re O'Quinn, 143 B.R. 408 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1992).
192. See id. at 409.
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debtors and creditors the discretion to negotiate for a resolution of the is-
sue in the plan. The Code and legislative history strongly support that
position, and policy considerations suggests that allowing the parties to
determine who has the right to undistributed funds upon conversion is
the ideal rule.
1. Support from Bankruptcy Code
Several relevant provisions of the Code support the notion that
Congress intended for the parties to negotiate for a term in the plan that
would resolve the current issue should such a situation arise in their case.
As a threshold matter, there are no Code provisions that would prevent
the parties from explicitly stating which party has the right to the undis-
tributed payments upon conversion to a Chapter 7 case. In fact, the Code
explicitly supports this position through § 1322(b).1 93 As aforemen-
tioned, § 1322(b) explicitly permits certain provisions that the plan
"may" include.194 Again, examples of what § 1322(b) explicitly allows
for include: (1) the modification of the rights of either unsecured or se-
cured creditors,195 (2) the determination of whether the Chapter 13 estate
vests in the debtor or in another entity,196 and (3) the inclusion of "any
other appropriate provision not inconsistent"' 97 with the Code. These §
1322(b) provisions taken together are sufficient evidence that Congress's
intent was for the parties to resolve this issue in the plan. Furthermore, §
1327(b) states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the plan or the or-
der confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the prop-
erty of the estate in the debtor."'198 The italicized portion of that provi-
sion strongly suggests that Congress placed a large deal of importance on
the parties' ability to resolve issues in the plan. Additional support for
the belief that Congress intended the parties to negotiate for a provision
in the plan that would address the matter is provided through the relevant
legislative history.
2. Support from Legislative History
Legislative history further supports the position that Congress in-
tended for the parties to resolve the potential problem in the plan. As
made clear by the House Report previously discussed, Congress strives
193. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2012).
194. Id.
195. Id. § 1322(b)(2).
196. id. § 1322(b)(9).
197. Id. § 1322(b)(11).
198. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (emphasis added).
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to provide incentives for Chapter 13 bankruptcies.99 Allowing the par-
ties to settle the present issue in the plan adheres to that legislative intent
for various reasons.
First, by allowing the parties to resolve the issue in the plan, the
debtor will be more informed and will be able to make better decisions
throughout the case. The debtor's risk of losing undistributed funds be-
cause of a lack of knowledge will also decrease, which will thus increase
the attractiveness of Chapter 13 bankruptcies to the debtor. With this
knowledge and the debtor's power to convert at any time, °° the debtor
should have no hesitation about filing a Chapter 13 plan for fear of un-
necessarily funding a plan that is doomed to fail. Moreover, such a rule
will promote the debtor's freedom to contract and will allow the debtor
to use such a term as a negotiating chip to gain other debtor-favorable
provisions. Thus, giving the parties discretion to choose who receives
the undistributed funds increases the odds that an optimal deal is struck.
The benefits of empowering the parties with such discretion is further
demonstrated through a policy analysis.
3. Support from Policy
Policy considerations suggest that Congress's decision to leave the
resolution of the issue up to the parties was a prudent one. Aside from
the policy of creating incentives for the debtor to file a Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy, discussed above, the creditors also receive benefits from such a
rule. First, the creditors will also benefit from the predictability that will
ensue if the parties resolve the issue in the plan, such as being able to
make more beneficial and informed decisions throughout the remainder
of the case. Again, such a rule will promote the creditors' rights to freely
contract and will allow them to use the term as a bargaining chip. The
increase in contractual rights will correspondingly increase the potential
for the creation of an optimal deal for all creditors as well. Moreover, if
the debtor has the right to receive undistributed funds from the trustee
upon conversion, this will afford the creditors the opportunity to lobby
the trustee for quicker distributions of the funds held by the trustee. Giv-
en all the benefits of a rule that leaves the parties to determine who has a
right to undistributed funds upon conversion, action must be taken that
will explicitly make that the rule.
D. Congress or the Supreme Court should Explicitly Require the Parties
199. See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 57 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3340, 3366.
200. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a).
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to Resolve the Issue in the Plan
Through the above analyses, Congress clearly intended for the par-
ties to negotiate for the term in the plan. However, for the sake of clari-
ty, Congress should resolve the circuit split by requiring the parties to in-
clude a term in their plan that would resolve the issue if it should arise in
their case. Congress can do this by amending § 1322(a), which is the
provision that states which terms must be included in the plan, to require
the selection of the party that would receive the undistributed funds.
If Congress fails to require the parties to address the issue in the
plan by amending § 1322(a), the Supreme Court should grant certiorari
to address the issue. The Court can then resolve the current circuit split
by finding that the parties are implicitly required by the Code, legislative
history, and policy considerations to negotiate for the term in their plan.
As long as either Congress or the Supreme Court clearly states that the
parties are to establish a term that will resolve the issue should such a
situation arise, then all parties involved will benefit.
IV. CONCLUSION
As can be seen through the divergent opinions of the Third Circuit
in Michael, the Fifth Circuit in Harris, and the lower courts, analyses of
the Code, legislative history, and policy do not lead to a clear answer as
to whether a debtor or creditors should receive undistributed funds held
by a Chapter 13 trustee upon conversion. Additionally, the high number
of conflicting pre-1994 cases involving the same issue makes clear that
Congress deliberately chose not to address this matter when Congress re-
solved the previous circuit split in 1994. Moreover, the Code and legis-
lative history indicate that Congress intended the parties to negotiate for
a term in the plan that would resolve such an issue, and policy considera-
tions favor such a rule. Lastly, to clarify the rule, Congress should add to
§ 1322(a) a provision that requires the parties to establish a term in their
plan that would resolve such an issue, or the Supreme Court should grant
certiorari to explicitly state that such a term is required in the plan.
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